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AESTHETICS IN OHIO LAND USE LAW: PRESERVING
BEAUTY IN THE PARLOR AND KEEPING PIGS IN THE
BARNYARD
by
EDWARD

H.

ZIEGLER, JR.-

I. INTRODUCTION

Traditional zoning restrictions on residential use, lots, and yards invariably involved what Ohio lawyer Alfred Bettman, an early supporter of urban planning, once described as an official regard for "the look of things."'
These traditional zoning controls though were constitutionally sanctioned on
the nuisance analogy basis that such restrictions promoted the orderly development of healthy, safe and quiet residential neighborhoods.2 Aesthetic values
generally were held to be beyond the scope of police power regulation.' In
1930, Judge Cardozo could state: "One of the unsettled questions of the law is
the extent to which the concept of nuisance may be enlarged by legislation so
as to give protection to sensibilities that are merely cultural or aesthetic.""
Today the narrow vision of early zoning programs based on the German
model of a clean and well-ordered community' is augmented in Ohio and other
states by a variety of forms of aesthetic regulation.' As Norman Williams has
pointed out: "In no other area of planning law has the change in judicial attitudes been so complete."' Rather than simply the prevention of blighted slum
districts and the promotion of orderly community development, the focus of
*Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law; L.L.M. 1975, George Washington: J.D. 1973,
University of Kentucky; B.A. 1970, University of Notre Dame. The author gratefully acknowledges the support for the preparation of this article provided by a Faculty Fellowship Grant from the University of
Dayton Research Institute.
'Comment, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REv. 834, 857 (1924). Alfred Bettman, a Cincinnati
lawyer and early member of that city's Plan Commission, was active in urban planning and reform locally
and nationally throughout his career. A discussion of the role played by Bettman's famous amicus brief in
the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), upholding the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning, is found in Tarlock, Euclid
Revisited. LAND USE & ZONING DIG., Jan. 1982, at 4. 5-7.
'See, e.g.. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 394-95. A nuisance rationale also supported
pre-zoning land use controls in Ohio and other states. See State ex rel. Morris v. City of East Cleveland, 31
Ohio Dec. 98 (C.P. 1919) aff'don rehearing. 22 N.P. (n.s.) 549, 31 Ohio Dec. 197 IC.P. 1920): 8 E. McQUILLIN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.03 (1983).
'E.g., City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).
'People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 248, 172 N.E. 485, 487 (1930).
'The early history and theory of zoning is discussed in S. TOLL. ZONED AMERICAN 124-25 (1969).
'An aesthetic regulation generally is considered to be any police power restriction which has as its purpose
the creation or preservation of a visually pleasing environment, whether or not linked with other derivative
public purposes such as protecting property values, public safety, or encouraging tourism and economic
development. Such a regulation is sometimes said to involve the imposition of restrictions on land use or
development that would have no effect on the sensibilities of a person without sight. See Dukeminier, Zoningfor Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 218, 223 (1955).
'1 N. WILLIAMS. AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §11.02 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
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much land use regulation today is on implementing aesthetic policy.8
Use of the police power to promote aesthetic values in land use and
development has had a nearly universal appeal. In recent years public officials
have enacted and courts generally have upheld a variety of forms of aesthetic
regulation Such things as screening fences, the parking of recreational
vehicles, the size, type and location of signs and billboards, and the architectural style of structures on the land all have been held to be within the
legitimate scope of police power regulation." Traditional legal doctrine which
limited the police power to instances of "clear necessity" and prohibited its use
to promote purely aesthetic values has been largely replaced by widespread
judicial acceptance of the notion that the general welfare may be promoted by
police power regulation aimed at maintaining or creating a visually beautiful
environment. At the federal level, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that
aesthetic values constitute a legitimate public purpose for police power regulation." Similarly, Ohio and other state courts have ruled that purely aesthetic
values may be furthered in regulation of land use and development. 2
This change in aesthetic doctrine has been based largely on the rationale
that unsightly utilization of land can have adverse affects on people or on property values that are just as real and troublesome as those created by noise,
smoke, odors or other common nuisances that impact on the quality of the environment. Since one of the basic principles of traditional zoning theory is the
separation of incompatible land uses and structures, the unsightly appearance
'Legal literature dealing with aesthetics is too extensive for complete listing, but some of the more recent law
review contributions on aesthetics as a purpose for regulation of land use and development are Aronovsky,
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetics, the First Amendment, and the Realities of Billboard
Control 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 295 (1981); Bishop, Aesthetic Regulation From Junkyards to Residences? 61
N.C.L. REV. 942 (1983); Bohlman & Dundas, Local Control of Architecture: Is It Legal 9 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 17 (1980); Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 355 (1982); Rose, Preservationand Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation,
33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981); Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power.: The New General
Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. REV. 603 (1981); Smith, Judicial Review of
Historic and Landmark Preservation Ordinances, 15 URB. LAW. 555 (1983).
9
See Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125 (1980).
10See, e.g., I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at §§ 11.01-.21.
"See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (regulation of signs and
billboards); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (open-space zoning); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978) (historic landmark designation).
2
Ohio court decisions upholding regulation of land use and development to promote purely aesthetic values
are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 70-79. The vast majority of state courts that have recently
addressed the issue now uphold regulation of land use based largely or exclusively on aesthetic considera-

tions. See, e.g., Bufford, supra note 9; 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 7.13-.25 (1968 &
Supp. 1981); 1A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF PLANNING AND ZONING § 14.01 (1975 & Supp. 1984); WILLIAMS,

supra note 7, at §§ 11.01-.21.
For a discussion of the so-called "quiet revolution" in land use control which led in part to the enactment
of a new generation of police power restrictions on land use and development promoting aesthetic and other
general welfare goals see F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (197 1)

and F.

POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND USE REFORM

(1981).
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of a use or structure which causes or contributes to such incompatibility has
been found by courts in Ohio and elsewhere to be a sufficient basis for ruling
that the use or structure is just as much in the wrong place and subject to exclusion or regulation, as in the words of Justice Sutherland, "a pig in the parlor
instead of the barnyard."' 3
To be sure, not everyone is sanguine about this transformation in legal
doctrine. Owners of land frequently argue that aesthetic regulation in
whatever form necessarily involves the imposition of inherently arbitrary
restrictions on private land use and that such restrictions are unconstitutional
as an unfair and uncompensated taking of private property rights for public
use." These arguments reflect the reasoning of traditional doctrine which as a
matter of due process prohibited aesthetic regulation of land use and development.I According to traditional doctrine the police power could not be used to
promote aesthetic values since beauty was considered a purely subjective matter of individual taste. Any official notion of visual beauty would therefore be
found lacking a rational basis in fact or logic and held to be arbitrary and
capricious. 6 As a limitation on the police power, traditional doctrine also read
into "due process" John Stewart Mill's simple principle that power cannot be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized society except to prevent
harm to others. 7 Aesthetic regulation was therefore prohibited by early court
decisions since its purpose was solely to secure some "benefit" for society
rather than the prevention of harm to health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community3 8
"Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 394-95.
"4While a discussion of the first amendment "taking issue" in the context of aesthetic regulation is beyond
the scope of this article, the Ohio Supreme Court generally has applied a "reasonable use" test for validity on
this issue. See Negin v. Board of Bldg. & Zoning Appeals, 69 Ohio St. 2d 492, 433 N.E.2d 165 (1982)
(minimum lot size restriction held unconstitutional). The United States Supreme Court also has applied a
.reasonable use" test for validity when a land use regulation is challenged as an uncompensated and unconstitutional taking of property for public use. See, e.g. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1979). See generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§
2.1-30 (1982).
"Traditional or so-called "early period" aesthetic doctrine in Ohio is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 28-52. A survey of state court decisions applying traditional aesthetic doctrine is found in RATHKOPF,
supra note 12, at § 14.01.
"See, e.g., Curran Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 227, 107 P. 261, 264
(1910), where the Colorado Supreme Court, in holding a setback restriction on signs unconstitutional stated:
The cut of the dress, the color of the garment worn, the style of the hat, the architecture of the
building or its color, may be distasteful to the refined senses of some, but government can neither control nor regulate in such affairs. The doctrines of the Commune invest such authority in the state, but
ours is a constitutional government based upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, and
does not seek, nor has it the power, to control him, except in those matters where the rights of others
are injuriously affected or imperiled.
"See, e.g., Passiac v. Patterson Bill Posting, A. & S.P. Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (1905)
("Aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity
alone which justifies the exercise of the police power.").
"The harm vs. benefit distinction traditionally has been ascribed major significance as a basis for differentiating the scope of the police power from the government's power of eminent domain. See Dunham, A
Legal and Economic Basisfor City Planning,58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958). At least in the area of
aesthetic regulation, that distinction may be more apparent than real in view of the recent decision of the
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More recently, debate over aesthetic regulation has focused on both the
wisdom and constitutionality of its impact on the democratic values of
pluralism and expression. 9 These democratic values which are constitutionally
endorsed by the substantive due process guarantee of freedom from arbitrary
restraints and the first amendment's protection of expression are often
restricted in scope by aesthetic regulation. Today even proponents of aesthetic
regulation express concern over the extent to which the official pursuit of
aesthetic values may come to override the values of democratic pluralism and
individual, political, and religious expression. 0
There is also an increasing awareness of the extent to which aesthetic
regulation is misused by private groups and developers to promote their own
narrow vision of the public interest." Critics argue that forms of aesthetic
regulation often are used simply to standardize the "subjective preferences" of
established residents. As a result (much needed and less expensive) alternative
forms of housing and living arrangements are thereby excluded from a community.2 In this regard, the legitimization of aesthetic regulation is sometimes
perceived as providing new opportunities for exclusionary land use policies to
be expressed in forms of police power regulation that allow an avowed concern
for the quality of the visual environment to mask the politics of intolerance
and selfishness. 3
The efficacy of aesthetic regulation also is being -questioned. Some
United States Supreme Court that a land use which frustrates a public purpose for regulation is a "harm"
regardless of whether the land use is harmful considered apart from that purpose. See Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 133-34 n.30. The distinction also has been blurred by Ohio court decisions legitimizing aesthetic regulation of land use to promote the happiness, comfort and general well-being
of the community. See Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 73, 458 N.E.2d 852, 856
(1984). A reformulation of aesthetic doctrine in Ohio limiting the scope of police power regulation to the
prevention of harm to "associational values" derived from existing visual features of the environment is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 164-99.
"See, e.g., Village of Hudson at 74, 458 N.E.2d at 857 (Brown, J., dissenting). Commenting on the ruling of
the Ohio Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of aesthetic "look alike" architectural controls, Justice Brown stated that the court's decision "placed us in the era of Orwell's '1984' where Big Brother tells us
what to do and think in a realm that is protected by the constitutional right of privacy under the first amendment of the United States Constitution." Id. at 858. See also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984) (political speech); Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983) (exclusion of churches from residential
district); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio St. 2d 539, 433 N.E.2d
198 (1982) (commercial and political speech); Note, Aesthetic Regulation and the First Amendment, 3 VA. J.
NAT. REs. L. 237 (1984); Note, First Amendment Challenges to Landmark Preservation Statutes, I I FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (1982).
'See, e.g., Costonis supra note 8, at 446-58; Pearlman, Zoning and the First Amendment, 16 URB. LAW. 217
(1984); Rowlett, supra note 8; Williams, Subjectivity, Expression and Privacy; Problems of Aesthetic
Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1562 (1984).
21
See C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING 37 (1979); R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 20-21
(1977).
'See Daffron, Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 81 (1975); Ziegler, The Twilight of SingleFamily Zoning, 3 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.J. POL'Y 161, 181-207 (1983).

"See B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 119-38 (1979); Popper, supra note 12, at 67-70;

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, HARPER'S,

Dec. 1977, at 49.
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observers contend that official aesthetic policies have produced, at best, only
mixed results in the enhancement of the design and visual quality of the environment."' Recognition of the practical problems involved in the implementation of aesthetic policy and of the limited role that aesthetic regulation may
actually play in shaping design and development of the built environment has
led some early supporters of aesthetic regulation to counsel against its
widespread and indiscriminate implementation in order to avoid the risks of
possible unintended and adverse consequences. 5
Much of the criticism of aesthetic regulation and the problems it raises
result in part from the failure of state courts to adequately articulate the
legitimate role and scope of aesthetics in regulation of land use and development. While the clear trend
in state court decisions is to uphold regulation based
"solely on aesthetics,"26 courts generally have been unable or unwilling to articulate standards and authoritative criteria for judicial review of the validity
of official aesthetic policies and decisions. This failure is particularly apparent
in regard to judicial review of administrative decisions of public agencies which
implement aesthetic policy. The doctrines of "presumption of validity," and
"deference to administrative judgment" often substitute for careful analysis
and articulation by courts of legal standards which govern the valid role and
scope of aesthetic regulation.27
While there is increasing awareness of the conflicts, problems, and potential for abuse inherent in aesthetic regulation, this is unlikely to result in
widespread judicial retrenchment to traditional doctrine. Instead, Ohio and
other state courts in the future are likely to attempt a more careful and definite
formulation of authoritative criteria for judicial review of official aesthetic
policies and decisions.
The purpose of this article is to initiate such an undertaking through an
analysis of aesthetic jurisprudence in Ohio land use law. Judicial development
by Ohio courts of the role of aesthetics in land use regulation seems particularly well suited for such a study. Ohio court decisions provide classic examples of
the three widely recognized stages in the development of aesthetic
jurisprudence and tend to reflect the concerns and difficulties found in recent
decisions of other state courts that have legitimized regulation "solely for
aesthetics." Analysis of Ohio court decisions may provide fertile ground for an
examination of how the formulation of more definite standards for judicial
review of official aesthetic policies can serve to reduce the uncertainty and
"See Costonis, supra note 8,at 369-7 i.
2Id.

"See, e.g., City of Sunrise v. D.C.A. Homes, Inc. 421 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. App. 1982); State v. Jones, 305 N.C.

520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Bufford, supra note 9. For a survey of state court decisions upholding land use
regulation solely for aesthetic purposes see WILLIAMS. supra note 7. at §§ I 1.10-.21.
"See Rowlett, supra note 8,at 647-50.
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confusion that now exist in regard to the legitimate role and scope of aesthetic
regulation in land use and development.
Part II of the article examines the judicial development by Ohio courts of
the role and scope of aesthetics in regulation of land use and development.
Discussion and analysis focuses on the three stages or periods in the judicial
development of aesthetic doctrine in Ohio land use law:
(1) The early period when due process considerations supported the doctrine that the police power may not be used to promote aesthetic
values;
(2) The middle or transition period when early doctrine was reformulated
to allow aesthetic considerations in police power regulation so long as
regulation furthered some other traditional public purpose (such as
preservation of property values); and
(3) The modern period when aesthetic doctrine was again reformulated
by Ohio courts to expressly allow police power regulation of land use
and development to promote purely aesthetic values.
Part III of the article provides an analysis and critique of the legitimate
role and scope of aesthetics in regulation of land use and development in view
of the standards for validity expressed in Ohio court decisions legitimizing
aesthetic regulation. In conclusion the author suggests a reformulation of
aesthetic doctrine embodying standards for judicial review of aesthetic regulation which attempt to reflect an express recognition of the problems inherent
in, and the social values furthered by such regulation.
II.

A.

AESTHETIC DOCTRINE IN OHIO

The Early Period

Even prior to the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision
upholding the validity of local zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,2" the Ohio Supreme Court had already constitutionally sanctioned local
use of the police power for extensive regulation of land use and development.
In a case of first impression, Pritz v. Messer,29 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld
the validity of local zoning which restricted by districts the use, area, height
and bulk of structures in land development throughout a municipality. The
court ruled these local restrictions on land use and development were within
the legitimate scope of police power regulation, finding that a reasonable relationship existed between "this effort of the city to plan its physical life" and the
"material welfare of the community."30 Relying on state court decisions from
2272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2'112

Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).

w1d.at 645, 149 N.E. at 35. Ohio court decisions hold that a police power regulation of land use is valid as a
matter of substantive due process so long as the regulation bears a real and substantial relation to a
legitimate public purpose - defined to include health, safety, morals or the general welfare. E.g., Benjamin

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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other jurisdictions, the Ohio court in Pritz upheld the validity of local zoning
by following the then common "nuisance analogy" that zoning would tend to
promote the general welfare by protecting public health, morals and safety.3'
The Ohio court in Pritz applied the general maxim that where a legislative
enactment is challenged as a violation of due process the judicial function is
not to determine whether the law is "wise or the best that might have been
adopted" but only whether the law in question is constitutional.32 The court
stated that the due process issue of whether a law has a real and substantial
relationship to legitimate public purpose is a question left in "the first instance"
to the discretion of the legislative body which enacted the law." A police power
restriction on land use would be held unconstitutional, the Ohio court ruled,
only where it is clear that the restriction in question has no reasonable connection to a legitimate public purpose.
In Pritz, the Ohio court declared that the scope of the police power would
generally include any restriction on land use "reasonably necessary for the
preservation of the public health, morals or safety."'" All property within the
state, the court observed, "is held subject to the implied condition that it will be
so used as not to injure the equal right of others to the use and benefit of their
own property."" But in regard to aesthetic policy, the Ohio court in Pritz ruled
that the scope of the police power would not include restrictions imposed "for
purely aesthetic reasons. 36 The court noted, however, a restriction on land use
that is otherwise valid would not be invalidated simply because "an aesthetic
v. Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957). For a discussion of the "presumption of validity" accorded legislation enactments by Ohio courts see Brown v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St. 2d 93, 95, 420 N.E.2d
103, 105 (1981).
Local communities in Ohio have authority to enact police power restrictions on land use and development
under the provisions of zoning and subdivision enabling statutes and, in the case of chartered municipalities,
under the home rule provisions of Article X1II, § 3, of the Ohio Constitution.
11112 Ohio St. 628, 651, 149 N.E. 30, 37 (1925).
32
1d. at 639, 149 N.E. at 33.
111d. at 639, 149 N.E. at 34.
"Id. at 638, 149 N.E. at 33.
"Id. at 638, 149 N.E. at 33. In addition to the due process provision of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution, the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted as "due process" limitations on police
power regulation the provisions of Article 1, §§ I and 19 of the Ohio Constitution. See Pritz v. Messer, 112
Ohio St. 628, 634-35, 149 N.E. 30, 32-33 (1925).
Article 1, § I of the Ohio Constitution states: "All men, are, by nature, free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety."
Article 1, § 19 of the Ohio Constitution states in part: "Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but
subservient to the public welfare."
The Ohio Supreme Court may, of course, independently interpret the above provisions of the Ohio Constitution as a more strict due process limitation on state and local regulation than the due process limitation
of the fourteenth amendment, and has, in fact, done so in regard to aesthetics. See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 16
Ohio St. 2d 128, 133, 243 N.E.2d 66, 71 (1968) (refusing to expand the scope of the general welfare with
respect to regulation promoting visual beauty to coincide with a decision of the United States Supreme
Court indicating that such an expansion would be permissible.) The Buckley decision is discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 70-77.
'112 Ohio St. 628, 638, 149 N.E. 30, 33 (1925).
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benefit incidentally results" therefrom."
The Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Pritz that restrictions on land use for
aesthetic purposes were beyond the lawful scope of police power regulation
was directly applied by that court in City of Youngstown v. Kahn Brothers
Building Co.,"8 a case decided the same day as Pritz. In City of Youngstown,
the Ohio court held a local ordinance unconstitutional which allowed only
single and two family dwellings in a certain district of a municipality. The
court found that the restriction's exclusion of apartment dwellings had no
reasonable relation to health, safety, morals or the public welfare. Such a
restriction, the Ohio court stated, if based on "aesthetic considerations" is
beyond the legitimate scope of police power regulation."
In City of Youngstown the Ohio court noted that while the pursuit of
aesthetic values is "commendable and desirable" it is "not essential to the
public need."' Since the police power "is based upon public necessity," the
court stated "the public health, morals, or safety, and not merely an aesthetic
interest, must be in danger in order to justify its use.""' The Ohio court further
observed that the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic values might lead certain
legislatures to prefer "to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for
posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for Keats." 2 This problem
of agreement "as to what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint," the
Ohio court declared, "makes the aesthetic standard impractical as a standard of
restriction upon property.""3
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in City of Youngstown, holding the
pursuit of aesthetic values to be beyond the legitimate scope of police power
regulation, has often been cited by both state courts and commentators as a
classic formulation of traditional doctrine during the early development of
aesthetic jurisprudence." This traditional doctrine, adopted by Ohio and other
state courts at the time, considered aesthetic values to be beyond the scope of
direct state control since official aesthetic judgments were deemed to be inherently subjective and arbitrary, and were said to involve merely questions of
taste as opposed to the prevention of some real or substantial harm to the
public welfare.'"
37Id.
3j112

Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842 (1925).

111d. at 661, 148 N.E. at 844.

QId.
"Id. at 662, 148 N.E. at 844.
42Id.
43

1d.

"See, e.g., Sun Oil Company of Penn. v. City of Upper Arlington, 55 Ohio App. 2d 27, 29, 379 N.E.2d 266,
268 (1977); ANDERSON. supra note 12 at § 7.17.
"The judicial attitude which shaped traditional doctrine prohibiting aesthetic regulation is said to reflect
both the Puritan ethic and the individualistic frontier spirit. See Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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The traditional doctrine set forth in City of Youngstown was later cited
and followed by Ohio courts in cases involving local land use restrictions
governing the height of fences,' excluding churches from residential areas, '
and prohibiting commercial uses on certain tracts of land 8 when the purpose
for regulation was found to involve primarily aesthetic considerations. Ohio
court decisions during this early period indicated the traditional doctrine
would be followed even when the aesthetic effect of a prohibited use might
tend to reduce neighboring property values. 9 As late as 1959 the Ohio
Supreme Court, in a decision reviewing the law governing the theory and practice of zoning, held that restrictions on land use and development should not
be imposed "simply to please the aesthetic tastes and protect the economic investment of the next-door neighbor."50
Ohio courts, however, were not always entirely comfortable in following
the precedent of traditional doctrine. As stated by an Ohio appellate court in
an early opinion, "[ilt offends one's sense of propriety that the beauty of a
neighborhood should be violated by a ... [usel that may conform to the requirements of health, safety, and morals, and yet offend all the canons of good
taste."'" It is "unfortunate," this same court stated, that the police power is
"helpless against things that are only ugly in appearance."52
B.

The Middle Period

By the early 1960's a number of state courts already had rejected traditional aesthetic doctrine. 3 In its place, state courts increasingly adopted the socalled middle or transition period doctrine which held that aesthetic values are
within the lawful scope of police power regulation so long as regulation furthers some other non-aesthetic public purpose such as protecting public safety
The all-pervasive influence of the Bible on the Puritan ethic crossed the sea with the Pilgrim fathers
and found its way into the philosophic underpinnings of American law and mores. That "Beauty is
Vain" is writ large in Proverbs and early American history. The aesthetic for the Puritan settlers of
this country was at best an excresence, the dalliance of the dilettante, the delight of the dandy, the
escape of the excessively rich.
For the American of the early 19th century, pioneering his rugged and perilous way through the
trackless forest, beauty lay not in buildings but, if at all, in the mighty carvings of mountains by swiftcoursing rivers and the endless plains of an everwidening frontier. Utility of necessity was his beauty.

1'See Wondrak v. Kelley, 120 Ohio St. 268, 195 N.E. 65 (1935).
"See State ex rel. Synod of United Lutheran Church v. Joseph, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 317, 323 (1941), affd, 139
Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1941).
"See State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929).
"9See, e.g.. State ex rel. United Lutheran Church, 36 Ohio L. Abs. at 323.
"State ex rel. Killeen Realty Co. v. East Cleveland, 169 Ohio St. 375, 385, 160 N.E.2d I, 7 (1959).
"State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. at 41 I, 169 N.E. at 715.
321d.
"See, e.g., Farley v. Graney, 146 W.Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960) (screening fence for junkyards); Dade
County v. Gould, 99 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1957) (restrictions on billboards); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (architectural
review).
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or the preservation of property values." Aesthetic jurisprudence was reformulated during this period by judicial acceptance of the idea that the "general
welfare" of the public might include police power restrictions on land use that
permitted, in part, some official notion of visual beauty in regard to the appearance of a community.
This transition in aesthetic doctrine officially occurred in Ohio with the
1964 decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Ghaster Inc. v. Preston." The
trial court in Ghaster had applied traditional aesthetic doctrine to hold a
statute unconstitutional which prohibited commercial signs and billboards
within a certain distance of interstate highways within the state. The Ohio
Supreme Court held the statute constitutional, finding such a restriction would
tend to promote both highway safety and the general welfare of the public who
use the highways. The court pointed out that the scope of the police power had
been significantly expanded in recent years beyond simply the furtherance of
public health, morals and safety. The "general welfare," the Ohio court ruled,
is "a separate basis" for police power regulation of land use and the legislature
may lawfully consider the effect of such a restriction in promoting "the comfort, convenience and peace of mind of those who use the highways, by removing annoying intrusions upon that use." 6
The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion in Ghaster avoided the issue of
whether aesthetic considerations alone might constitute a legitimate public
purpose for regulation. However, after quoting extensively from other state
court decisions, the Ohio court clearly adopted the view that the promotion of
visual beauty to enhance the enjoyment and pleasure of motorists by the
elimination of commercial signs "offensive to the sight" was a legitimate factor
for legislative consideration in adopting land use restrictions."' Quoting a New
York court decision upholding the regulation of commercial billboards, the
court's opinion in Ghasterdeclared that "Ibleauty may not be queen but she is
not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect."5 8
The Ohio court in Ghasteralso noted that the consideration and weighing
of all the factors which inhere in the concept of the general welfare is a function largely left to the discretion of the legislative branch. A legislative determination that a land use restriction promotes certain public purposes, the court
declared, would not be set aside by a reviewing court unless on the record it is
found to be "manifestly unreasonable."59 The Ohio court thereby indicated
4

5'See.

e.g., ANDERSON. supra note 12, at § 7.22.

'1176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
6Id. at 437-38, 200 N.E.2d at 337.
111d. at 437, 200 N.E.2d at 337.
"1d.at 436, 200 N.E.2d at 336.
"Id. at 434, 200 N.E.2d at 335. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a local ordinance allowing on-site
commercial signs but not political signs violates the first amendment. See Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc.
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio St. 2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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that the usual "presumption of validity rule" accorded legislative determinations in other areas would also be applied to legislative findings regarding an
aesthetic purpose for regulation.
Another Ohio court opinion involving the reformulation of traditional
aesthetic doctrine during this transition period is the 1963 decision of an Ohio
appellate court in Reid v. Architectural Board of Review.6 0 In Reid, the appellate court upheld the validity of a decision by a local Architectural Board of
Review (Board) refusing to approve a building permit application for a residential dwelling. The court also upheld the constitutionality of the local ordinance
which granted the Board such authority. The court found that the local ordinance promoted the "general welfare" by authorizing the Board to disapprove of building applications when the proposed construction would not
maintain the "high character of community development" or "protect real
estate from impairment or destruction of value."' 6' The court ruled that the fact
that one of the purposes of the ordinance was to promote aesthetic values did
not render the ordinance invalid.
The appellate court in Reid held that the Board had not abused its discretion under the ordinance in refusing to approve the building application in
question. The building application had proposed the construction of a singlefamily house involving a flat roofed complex of twenty modules with walls of
glass and concrete panels. The modules were to be arranged in a loosely formed
U which, together with a detached garage of similar construction, would be entirely screened off from the street by a solid wall ten feet high enclosing a
garden area. The court found that the Board's decision had been based in part
on aesthetic objections to the design and appearance of the proposed house
since, when viewed from the street, the house would not indicate "a structure
for people to live in. ' 62 However, the court concluded that there were other
factors that had influenced the Board's decision. The radical design of the proposed house would not conform to the general character of other houses in the
area, would not preserve nearby property values and would be detrimental to
future development of three vacant lots nearby.63 Since these latter described
"general welfare" factors had apparently influenced the Board's decision, the
court ruled the Board had not relied on purely aesthetic considerations in
refusing to approve the application and that the decision of the Board was
therefore lawful.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Corrigan argued that the court's decision in
Reid was not supported by the record developed in the trial court." Houses in
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)). See generally Aronovsky, supra note 8.
1119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).

611d. at 69, 192 N.E.2d at 76.
621d. at 71, 192 N.E.2d at 77.
'1d. at 70. 192 N.E.2d at 77-78.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1986
192 N.E.2d at 78.
"Id. at 72,

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 1
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1

the neighborhood, Judge Corrigan pointed out, had obviously varying lot sizes
and price values and represented a melange of architectural styles including,
among others Tudor, Spanish Colonial, and flat-roofed modern, with some of
brick construction, some of wood, and some a combination of both. 5 The
Board's finding that the proposed house would not conform to the character of
houses in the area should therefore be reversed, Judge Corrigan maintained,
since houses in the neighborhood lacked any distinctive character. Judge Corrigan further argued that there was no support in the record for the court's
findings that the proposed house would impair property values in the
neighborhood and be detrimental to the development of nearby vacant lots. In
Judge Corrigan's view, the Board's decision was based simply on objections to
the exterior appearance of the proposed house and therefore violated Ohio law
prohibiting restrictions on land use "for purely aesthetic reasons.""
The middle-period formulation of aesthetic doctrine set out in the Ghaster
and Reid decisions discussed above was not entirely replaced by the reformulation of aesthetic doctrine which occurred in Ohio and other states during the
modern period. The middle-period doctrine, which holds that a police power
restriction on land use can be based on aesthetics so long as some other
legitimate public purpose is also furthered by regulation, has continued to be
applied by Ohio courts as an alternative rationale in cases where a restriction
on land use would not satisfy the modern test for validity of a regulation promoting "purely aesthetic values." 67
C.

The Modern Period

The environmental movement of the 1960's and the 1970's led to the enactment of a new generation of land use controls which were often directed at
the management of aesthetic values. Federal, state, and local regulatory programs were established which placed the goal of ensuring an aesthetically and
culturally pleasing environment at the forefront of public policy governing
land use and development." Within a short time, state courts were called upon
to resolve the "due process" constitutionality of land use restrictions which
were clearly based on aesthetic considerations. Resulting court decisions which
held that the police power may be lawfully used to promote purely aesthetic
values are said to mark the modern-period development in aesthetic
jurisprudence. 9
This reformulation of aesthetic doctrine occurred in Ohio with the 1968
"Id.at 72, 192 N.E.2d at 80.
at 73, 192 N.E.2d at 81.
"See infra text accompanying notes 87-107.
6Id.

"See generally. POPPER, supra note 12; Costonis, supra note 8, at 361-67.
"State court decisions upholding land use regulation "solely for aesthetics" are surveyed in ANDERSON, supra
note 12, at § 7.24; WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at §§ 11.10-.21.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Buckley.70 Buckley upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute which required junkyards outside of a
municipality to be obscured from the view of motorists by a fence of at least six
feet in height. The court directly addressed the issue of whether aesthetic considerations alone may support restrictions on land use and development.
Declaring that the lawful scope of police power regulation in promoting the
general welfare must necessarily "change with the times," the court ruled that
aesthetic considerations alone are sufficient to support regulation so long as
the aesthetic harm caused by the offending structure or use "is generally patent
and gross, and not merely a matter of taste."'" Applying this standard, the Ohio
court held the fencing requirement constitutional, finding the harm caused to
the natural aesthetics of the surrounding countryside by an unfenced junkyard
to be "generally patent and gross.""
The Ohio Supreme Court emphasized in Buckley that its decision was
"not to be construed as a blanket approval of all regulation based upon
aesthetics."" Such a broad holding, the court stated, would presuppose "an exact definition of beauty which is acceptable to all tastes. '74 The court further
ruled that the "generally patent and gross" standard for validity would have to
be satisfied in the context of an aesthetic regulation's application to any given
set of facts.7" An aesthetic regulation would therefore be held unconstitutional,
not only in the traditional due process sense when the aesthetic purpose for
regulation would not be furthered as applied, but also where a "generally patent and gross" aesthetic harm would not be prevented by the regulation's application due to existing aesthetic conditions in the surrounding area.76
Clearly implicit in the court's decision in Buckley is that an aesthetic
regulation may not impose some official notion of visual beauty on a particular
land use solely because the appearance or design of the land use in question is
found to be offensive or ugly. The validity of an aesthetic regulation would
have to be judged not by whether its impact on a particular land use promotes
visual beauty in and of itself, but whether the effect of regulation on the particular land use prevents an appearance or design that is patently or grossly out
of harmony with the visual character of the surrounding area. Stated from
another perspective, Buckley would seem to sanction regulation directed at
preventing serious harm to the existing visual character of an area but not
regulation which is directed at simply improving the visual beauty of a par" 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).

111d. at 132, 243 N.E.2d at 70.
"2d.
"Id. at 133, 243 N.E.2d at 70.
"Id

"Id. at 132, 243 N.E.2d at 70.
761d
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ticular land use or upgrading the visual character of an entire area or
neighborhood. Such distinctions can be reasonably inferred from the Ohio
court's express refusal in Buckley to accept as a standard for police power
regulation the much broader "beauty for beauty's sake alone" rationale held
acceptable for the power of eminent domain by the United States Supreme
Court in Berman v. Parker.7
The modern reformulation of aesthetic doctrine set forth in Buckley has
been applied in a rather straightforward fashion in several later Ohio court decisions. For example, in Sun Oil Co. v. City of Upper Arlington,' an Ohio appellate court upheld the constitutionality of aesthetic provisions in a local zoning code which restricted the use and appearance of freestanding commercial
signs. The zoning ordinance prohibited the use of free-standing commercial
signs except where related to on-site activities and where an attached sign
would be in harmony with the building thereon. The ordinance further imposed height, size, color, number and other aesthetic restrictions on permitted
free-standing signs. Citing Buckley, the appellate court held the aesthetic
restrictions valid, interpreting the ordinance as intending to limit application of
the restrictions "to situations where the maintenance of a free-standing sign
would be in gross contrast to the surrounding area as to be patently offensive
to the surrounding neighborhood, rather than merely a question of taste."79
Similarly, in P & S Investment Co. v. Brown,"° an Ohio appellate court
upheld the constitutionality of a local zoning restriction which was applied to
prohibit the storage of construction trailers in a business district located in
close proximity to a residential area. The trailers in question, which had
originally been painted red and had been in use for a number of years, were
found by the court to be "an eyesore to the neighborhood.""1 Applying the
Buckley test of validity, the court ruled that "when the appearance of a use in
violation of permitted uses in a particular zone is in such gross contrast to the
permitted uses of such zone as to be patently offensive" prohibition of such use
"is a valid exercise of the police power" though the prohibition is "based upon
at 133, 243 N.E.2d at 70. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the implication of Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954), that the mere pursuit of visual beauty would be within the scope of police power regulation. Although Berman involved the power of eminent domain, the following language from that opinion
frequently has been quoted by state courts in support of aesthetic regulation of land use:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inconclusive ....The values is represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33.
Ohio courts have sanctioned the pursuit of visual beauty as a lawful purpose for both private restrictive
covenants affecting land use and the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See Bailey Dev. Corp. v.
MacKinnon-Parker, Inc., 60 Ohio App. 2d 307, 313, 397 N.E.2d 405, 410 (1977) (restrictive covenant);
Richley v. Crow, 43 Ohio Misc. 94, 334 N.E.2d 542 (1975) (scenic easement).
7955 Ohio App. 2d 27, 379 N.E.2d 266 (1977).
17Id.

'id. at

31, 379 N.E.2d at 269.

"040 Ohio App. 2d 535, 320 N.E.2d 675 (1974).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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Both appellate courts in the P & S Investment Co. and Sun Oil Co. decisions interpreted the aesthetic rationale of Buckley as limited to regulation
which prevents a patent and gross harm to the aesthetic character of the surrounding area. Where Ohio courts have found that such an aesthetic purpose
would not be furthered by an aesthetic restriction as applied to a particular
land use, the restrictions in question have been held unconstitutional. In
Brooks v. Cook Chevrolet, Inc.," an Ohio appellate court held an aesthetic
restriction in a local ordinance governing the maximum display area of commercial signs to be unconstitutional as applied to free-standing and protruding
signs. The court found that a provision of the ordinance which required computation of allowed sign area by including both sides of a sign facing perpendicular to a highway would not result in furtherance of the aesthetic purpose
of the ordinance and was therefore arbitrary and unreasonable." In City of
Euclid v. Fitzthum85 an Ohio appellate court held unconstitutional a local ordinance which prohibited the outside storage or parking of trailers and recreational vehicles in a residential area. The court found that the ordinance would
not promote public health or safety. The court further ruled that the ordinance
would be unconstitutional if enacted "for purely aesthetic reasons."86
Presumably, though the Buckley test for validity was not mentioned, the ordinance was struck down because the outside parking or storage of such
vehicles would not be patently offensive to the aesthetic character of the area.
Where an aesthetic regulation would not satisfy the modern test for validity established in Buckley,"1 Ohio courts in some cases have held the regulation
constitutional by application of middle-period aesthetic doctrine. For example,
in City of PepperPike v. Landskroner,88 an Ohio appellate court in 1977 held a
provision of a local zoning ordinance constitutional which prohibited the outside storage of trailers and recreational vehicles in a residential district zoned
for single-family use. After discussing the development of aesthetic doctrine in
Ohio, including the Buckley "patently offensive" test of validity, the court ruled
that the regulation in question would be clearly unconstitutional if based solely
on aesthetic considerations. 9 However, the court held the regulation valid on
the ground that it furthered the legitimate public purpose of protecting the
character and integrity of a single-family neighborhood."
'lid. at 543, 320 N.E.2d at 680.
Ohio App. 2d 98, 296 N.E.2d 290 (1972).
"Id.at 106, 296 N.E.2d at 296.
'148 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976).
mid. at 300, 357 N.E.2d at 405.
"See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
U53 Ohio App. 2d 63, 371 N.E.2d 579 (1977).
334

"Id.at 74, 371 N.E.2d at 586.
9Id.
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Citing Reid v. ArchitecturalBoard of Review, 9' the court in City of Pepper Pike found the preservation of the character of the neighborhood to be a
public purpose supporting the regulation separately and distinctly from what
the court described as the regulation's "incidental or secondary aesthetic
effect."92 As in Reid, the court provided no explanation for its conclusion that
the purpose of preserving the character of an area was not a purely aesthetic
purpose for regulation. Such a distinction seems unsupportable in view of the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Buckley that the validity of a purely
aesthetic restriction would depend on prevention of a "patently offensive"
harm to the character of the surrounding area.93
More recently, in the 1984 decision Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc.,9"
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of aesthetic "look-alike"
provisions in a local zoning code and the implementation of the provisions by a
local Architectural Board of Review to prohibit the use of solid stone aggregate
panels instead of plate glass windows in the front of a retail store located in a
commercial shopping plaza. Noting that the evolving trend is to grant aesthetic
considerations a more significant role in police power regulation of land use,
the Ohio court ruled that an aesthetic restriction affecting the appearance of a
community "relates closely to its citizens' happiness, comfort, and general wellbeing." Accordingly, aesthetic considerations are a legitimate factor to be considered in adopting regulations." The Ohio court, however, did not apply the
''patently offensive" test of Buckley to determine the validity of the
"look-alike" provisions since it found that the provisions in question were not
based on solely aesthetic considerations but were also intended to protect nearby property values. Noting "the strong presumption of validity" accorded
legislative enactments, the Ohio court held the restrictions valid on the ground
that they reasonably furthered "the general welfare" by "protecting real estate
from impairment and destruction of value.""
The court in Village of Hudson also rejected the argument that the local
ordinance was unconstitutional on vagueness due process grounds because it
failed to establish sufficient standards to guide the local Review Board in applying the "look alike" restrictions to building permit applications.97 The Ohio
court held the ordinance constitutional, finding that the general purposes of
the ordinance (i.e., the protection of property values and the preservation of
the appearance and character of community development) were sufficiently
adequate criteria to guide the discretion of the Review Board in applying "ac" 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963). Reid is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 60-66.
253 Ohio App. 2d 63, 75, 371 N.E.2d 579, 586 (1977).

"See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
149 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).

'lid.
at 73, 458 N.E.2d at 856.
"Id. at 73, 458 N.E.2d at 857.
97id.
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cepted and recognized architectural principles" to determine if a proposed
structure would or would not be "harmonious" with existing development."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brown argued that the ordinance should
be held unconstitutional since the "look-alike" provisions of the ordinance
were based on purely aesthetic considerations." Justice Brown rejected the majority opinion's "protection of nearby property values" rationale on the ground
that there was no evidence whatsoever in the record that the ordinance as applied would have the effect of protecting real estate from impairment and
destruction of value.' ®
Justice Brown also expressed the view that the ordinance was unconstitutional on vagueness due process grounds because it failed to establish sufficient
standards to "adequately circumscribe the process of administrative decision"
and "provide ... an understandable criteria for judicial review" of the local
Review Board's decisions.' 0' According to Justice Brown, the standard of promoting "harmony with existing structures and terrain," even when coupled
with the statement of purposes in the ordinance, constituted a standard for
decision "impermissibly vague and indefinite," and therefore vested in the local
Review Board an "absolute power to impose its will on the private property interest of citizens."'0 2 The effect of the court's decision in Village of Hudson,
Justice Brown observed, would be to set the stage in Ohio for local governments to enact any aesthetic restriction on private land use that they desire.0 3
Much of the conflict in Village of Hudson between the opinion of the
court and the dissent of Justice Brown on the due process issue of whether the
ordinance furthered a legitimate public purpose can be reasonably attributed
to a difference in opinion as to whether the case presented a constitutional
challenge to the due process validity of the ordinance on its face or as applied.
The majority upheld the ordinance as reasonably related to protecting real
estate from impairment and destruction of value - a purpose for the enactment expressly set forth in the ordinance itself. The absence of discussion by
the court as to whether this purpose would be furthered by thte ordinance's application in the case at hand can be viewed as resulting from the court's opinion that the case presented only the constitutional issue of the due process
validity of the ordinance on its face. This interpretation is supported by the
fact that the opinion of the court in Village of Hudson simply affirmed a trial
"Id. at 74, 458 N.E.2d at 857.
"Id.
"Old. at 75-76, 458 N.E.2d at 858-59.
' Id. at 76, 458 N.E.2d at 859. For state court decisions supporting Justice Brown's position under similar
facts see Morristown Road Assoc. v. Mayor of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. Super. 58, 394 A.2d 157 (1978); City
of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
,01
Village of Hudson, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 77, 458 N.E.2d at 859.

Id.

103
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court decision ordering the owner of the retail store in question to submit to
the local Review Board its plans to alter the front of the store by replacing
plate glass windows with solid stone aggregate panels. The Review Board had
not yet ruled on the proposed alteration and the opinion of the court would
seem to leave open a later court challenge to a final decision by the Board
refusing to approve the alteration in question. The due process validity of the
ordinance as applied would then be an issue for resolution in the later court
proceeding with its determination presumably governed by existing Ohio case
law on point. If a final Board decision were based on purely aesthetic considerations the appropriate standard for court review would be the "patently
offensive" test established in Buckley,"o or, if based on protection of property
values, whether there exists substantive evidence in the record to support such
a finding.'"5 When so viewed, Village of Hudson seems entirely consistent with
earlier Ohio decisions which have upheld land use restrictions under the
middle-period formulation of aesthetic doctrine'0 and which have applied the
1
Buckley test for validity where regulation furthers purely aesthetic values. 07
Also, this view of Village of Hudson may explain in part why the majority
of the court did not share the concern of Justice Brown in his dissent as to
whether the ordinance set out either sufficient standards to guide the discretion of the Review Board or understandable criteria for judicial review.
Treating the decision as simply a ruling on the validity of the ordinance on its
face, the court would likely view a final decision by the Review Board that a
particular design for proposed development was either "too much alike" or
"too different" from surrounding development so as not be "harmonious" with
existing development as a decision limited by both the stated purposes of the
ordinance and the criteria for judicial review established by Ohio court decisions for determining the validity of a land use restriction as applied. 00 Under
this analysis, the "subjective considerations" inherent in a Review Board decision in any particular case would in theory be circumscribed by a later reviewing court's evaluation of whether the factual record supported a finding that
the purposes for the ordinance, aesthetic or otherwise, would actually be furthered as applied to the particular development in question. This interpretation
of the court's opinion in Village of Hudson as retaining the "patently
offensive" Buckley test for the validity of a purely aesthetic restriction as applied seems logical and correct, since the case itself did not involve the application of such a restriction and there is little in the opinion to suggest that the
"'See generally supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
"'See, e.g., Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. Scapell, 44 Ohio App. 2d 13, 19, 336 N.E.2d 637, 641
(1975).
" See generally supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
"'See generally supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
'See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1968). For a discussion of the due

process validity of an aesthetic regulation as applied see supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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court was overruling Buckley by implication so as to give blanket approval to
all regulations based solely on aesthetics.
III. A CRITIQUE AND REFORMULATION

A.

Analysis and Critique

Aesthetic doctrine in Ohio governing the due process validity of land use
regulation can be briefly restated in the following two simple propositions: (1)a
regulation is valid if it has a real and substantial relationship to a legitimate
public purpose (other than aesthetics) even though aesthetic considerations
may have played a part in its enactment;"° and (2)a regulation is valid if based
on purely aesthetic considerations so long as the harm to the aesthetic character of the surrounding area which the regulation prevents is generally patent
and gross, and not merely a matter of taste."10 As summary statements, the
foregoing legal propositions accuractely reflect aesthetic doctrine as presently
set forth in Ohio court decisions. As a definitive statement of aesthetic doctrine
in Ohio, however, the two propositions bring to mind the observation of the
late Justice Holmes that "the law" is often simply "chaos - with an index.""'
As the discussion below illustrates, these legal propositions, standing alone, appear to provide a less than adequate authoritative formulation of the juridical
criteria governing the validity of aesthetic regulation in Ohio.
1. Middle-Period Doctrine
The first proposition restates the middle-period formulation of aesthetic
doctrine that a regulation will be held valid, though based in part on aesthetic
considerations, if the regulation furthers some other legitimate public
purpose."' The doctrine was formulated as an attempt to accommodate
aesthetic considerations in regulation while recognizing and responding to the
concerns expressed in early court decisions regarding the inherent subjectivity
of aesthetic controls. The doctrine embodies the view that aesthetic values
alone are generally not sufficient to impede the interests in expression and selffulfillment associated with aesthetic activity and that purely aesthetic considerations are generally too subjective and arbitrary to serve as a legitimate
standard for police power regulation of property rights. The search for nonaesthetic public purposes to support regulation by Ohio and other state courts
under this middle-period formulation of aesthetic doctrine has been largely an
attempt to assimilate aesthetics to traditional police power goals. As applied,
the doctrine upholds the validity of a regulation not because it furthers
aesthetic values per se but because regulation is found to promote some other
'"See supra notes 55-67, 87-111 and accompanying text.
"'See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
"'Cited in C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW; TEACHER'S MANUAL IV-7

"'For a survey of state court decisions applying middle-period doctrine see
11.07-.09.
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traditional public purpose such as morality, public safety, the protection of
property values, or the future development of nearby land."'
On its face, middle-period doctrine simply restates the generally applicable
due process principle that a regulation is valid if it bears a real and substantial
relation to a legitimate public purpose."' In its application, however, Ohio and
other state courts have tended to ignore the fact that the traditional public purpose that is found to exist is often simply derivative of the aesthetic considerations supporting regulation."' Moreover, as critics of the doctrine have pointed
out, the often assumed linkage between aesthetics and traditional police power
goals is in many cases dubious, if not transparently fictional."' Ohio court decisions applying the doctrine, for example, have tended to assume the existence
of a linkage between the aesthetic effect of regulation and the protection of
property values."' Judicial efforts to verify such a relationship by evidence in
the record, however, have been perfunctory at best, a point emphasized by
dissenting opinions in both Reid"' and Village of Hudson."' In reality, the
relationship between aesthetic regulation and property values is extremely
variable and in many instances is simply indeterminable. 2° Application of the
doctrine to support aesthetic regulation based on the "logic" of such a linkage
is the result of what Norman Williams has labeled "muddled thinking" which
will "hardly stand under critical analysis."'' Ohio and other state courts have
tended to use the doctrine and its linkage rationale as largely a boot strapping
technique to uphold aesthetic regulation where no clear or even reasonably
plausible relationship to some other traditional public purpose can be shown to
exist. When applied in this manner, middle-period doctrine in effect allows
regulation based solely on aesthetics, and as a result not only undermines the
due process protection of freedom from arbitrary restraints, but also circumvents the express limitation imposed on purely aesthetic regulation by the
Ohio Supreme Court in its Buckley decision.'
Another interpretive problem in application of middle-period doctrine by
'"See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 12, at § 7.22. Middle-period court decisions in Ohio are discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 55-67, 87-111.
"'See, e.g., Benjamin v. Columbus, 66 Ohio St. 2d 93, 420 N.E.2d 103 (1981).

'See, e.g.. Michelman, Towarda Practical Standardfor Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAC. LAW. Feb., 1969, at
36-37.
"'See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 12, at §§ 7.15-20, 7.22-.23; Costonis, supra note 8, at 374; Michelman,
supra note 115, at 37; Rowlett, supra note 8, at 647.
"'See Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 2d 535, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Village of Hudson
v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).
"'Reid, 119 Ohio App. at 70, 192 N.E.2d at 78 (Corrigan, J., dissenting). Judge Corrigan's dissenting opinion
is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 64-66.

"'Village of Hudson, 9 Ohio St. 3d at 74, 458 N.E.2d at 857 (Brown, J., dissenting). Justice Brown's dissenting opinion is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 99-103.
"See Costonis, supra note 8, at 416.
121WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at § 71.18. Professor Michelman refers to such assumed linkages as "escapist
reasoning that evades the real issues." Michelman, supra note 115.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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Ohio courts is that decisions in some cases appear to limit an "aesthetic purpose" to situations where a restriction is imposed on a land use or structure
solely in an attempt to promote visual beauty in the form of the particular use
or structure itself. For example, Ohio courts in both Reid' and City of Pepper
Pike"' held that the goal of protecting the "character" of the area surrounding
a particular land use or structure was a non-aesthetic and legally sufficient2
public purpose for regulation of the visual form of the land use or structure.1
Clearly a restriction on the visual form of a land use or structure which is imposed to protect the aesthetic character of the surrounding area is a purely
aesthetic regulation. To rule otherwise seems not only illogical but clearly inconsistent with the view of the Ohio Supreme Court in Buckley that the test
for validity of a purely aesthetic regulation is whether the regulation prevents a
"patently offensive" harm to the aesthetic character of the surrounding area.
2. Modern Aesthetic Doctrine
The second proposition of law set forth in the beginning of this section
restates the Ohio Supreme Court's "patently offensive" Buckley test for the
validity of regulation which promotes purely aesthetic values.'27 This doctrine
attempts to both sanction aesthetics as a legitimate public purpose for regulation and, at the same time, limit the role and scope of aesthetic regulation to
situations where the aesthetic harm to the surrounding area is patently offensive.' This modern doctrine shares with middle-period doctrine the common
goal of accommodating aesthetics in land use regulation, and the common concern for establishing some standard to deal with the problem of the inherent
subjectivity of aesthetic values. Middle-period doctrine dealt with the problem
of the inherent subjectivity of aesthetics by requiring a search for a derivative
non-aesthetic public purpose for regulation, while modern doctrine addressed
the problem by limiting purely aesthetic regulation to preventing a "patently
offensive" harm to the aesthetic character of the surrounding area.
Both modern and middle-period aesthetic doctrines in Ohio also seem to
share the often evidenced assumption that the basic aesthetic value intended to
be furthered by regulation of land use is the pursuit of visual beauty.'29 To the
extent that this visual-beauty rationale underlies modern aesthetic doctrine in
Ohio, it creates substantial, if not insurmountable, interpretive problems in the
application of the doctrine. As the discussion below attempts to demonstrate,
'Reid, 119 Ohio App. 2d 535, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
"'City of Pepper Pike v. Landskroner, 53 Ohio App. 2d 63, 371 N.E.2d 579 (1977).
'"See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 70-76.
"'See generally supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
1nId
"'See e.g., State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132-33, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70(1968); Ghaster Properties, Inc.
v. Preston 176 Ohio St. 2d 425, 436-37, 200 N.E.2d 328, 336 (1964).
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an assumed visual-beauty rationale for regulation in applying the modern doctrine established in Buckley is likely to result in both undue limitation on the
role and scope of aesthetic regulation and exacerbation of the problem of
establishing intelligible validating standards governing enactment and administration of aesthetic controls.
A visual-beauty rationale for aesthetic regulation appears to have been a
presupposition underlying the Ohio court's formulation of modern aesthetic
doctrine in Buckley. 30 Recognizing the inherent subjectivity of notions of
visual beauty, the court in Buckley appropriately sought to limit the
legitimatization of aesthetic regulation to contexts which would substantially
reduce the need and search for idealized standards of beauty - standards embodying some presumably authoritative and objective set of ontologically based
canons of aesthetic formalism. Thus, the court refused to legitimize aesthetic
regulation directed solely at promoting beauty in the visual form of a particular land use or structure.' Regulating the visual form of a particular land
use or structure as an isolated work of art would necessarily require a standard
of beauty based on some set of principles of aesthetic formalism which embody
an infinite variety of combinations of factors such as proportion, color, line,
and interval, etc. - an absolutistic standard of beauty that simply does not exist. Quite obviously, the Ohio court refused to sanction such a role for police
power regulation.'32
The Buckley court expressly limited the role of aesthetic regulation to
controlling the visual form of a land use or structure so as to protect the visual
character of the surrounding area. 33 By so limiting the role of aesthetic regulation, the arbitrariness of regulating the visual form of a land use or structure as
an isolated work of art is avoided. The legitimizing standard of beauty for
regulation is at least grounded in the relationship existing between the form of
a particular land use or structure and the visual character of the area within its
perceptual field. Limiting aesthetic regulation to this latter described context
serves to reduce the range of factors and choices in defining and articulating
some standard of beauty to support regulation. Nevertheless, regulatory decisions based on some official standard of beauty, even when limited exclusively
to the relationship existing between the visual form of a particular land use or
structure and the visual character of the surrounding area, would still seem to
be hopelessly subjective and arbitrary, or as Ohio courts have so often stated
"merely a matter of taste."'' Faced with this dilemma but wishing to accom"0See State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).
'See supra text accompanying notes 70-77. Other state courts also have implicitly distinguished between
regulation protecting existing visual features of the environment and regulation creating visual beauty
afresh, the latter purpose being held to be beyond the lawful scope of aesthetic regulation. See, e.g., Mayor &

City Coun. of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 92, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
33

Id.
'See, e.g., State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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66 (1968).

22

Ziegler: Aesthetics In Ohio Land Use Law

Summer, 19851

AESTHETICS IN OHIO LAND USE LAW

modate the widespread legislative mandate for aesthetic regulation, Buckley
simply established as the controlling standard of beauty the "patently offensive" test for determining the validity of aesthetic regulation in this context.'35
Though incapable of being defined by ontologically based canons of aesthetic
formalism, the "patently offensive" standard, as a test for validity, might at
least serve to further restrict the degree of subjectivity involved in aesthetic
regulation by confining regulation to the prevention of those visual harms
which impact widely shared community values. 3 6
The Ohio Supreme Court's formulation of modern aesthetic doctrine in
Buckley is in many respects a commendable attempt to legitimize aesthetic
values in police power regulation while limiting regulation to the prevention of
harms deemed "patently offensive."' 37 In Buckley, the Ohio court, for the first
time, expressly upheld land use regulation promoting purely aesthetic values.
In doing so, the Ohio court opened the door to an explicit recognition by Ohio
courts that the aesthetic character of a community "relates closely to its
citizens' happiness, comfort, and general well-being."''
(a) Visual Beauty
While commendable, the formulation of aesthetic doctrine in Buckley
seems flawed in several respects. Clearly seeking to prevent regulation where
only matters of taste are involved, the court nevertheless seemed to retain the
visual-beauty rationale for aesthetic regulation.'39 A visual-beauty rationale for
regulation would continue the standards morass that the court itself tried to
avoid by establishing the "patently offensive" test for validity.'"' Limiting aesthetic regulation to "patently offensive" harms to the visual character of an
area still requires as an ultimate validating standard some official but undefinable test for visual beauty. While impliedly recognizing that for purposes of police power regulation the terms "beauty" and "ugliness" must be grounded in
the relational connotations existing between a particular land use or structure
and the visual character of the area within its perceptual field, the Ohio court's
"patently offensive" test must ultimately reflect, even in this relational context, some standard of beauty by which to measure what is "patently ugly."
1Id.

1'See P & S Inv. Co. v. Brown, 40 Ohio App. 2d 535, 540, 320 N.E.2d 675, 679 (1974) (applying "patently
offensive" test based on "what the reaction of most people in urban communities would be").
"'Other state courts which have upheld regulation of land use solely for aesthetics have established standards similar to the "patently offensive" test for limiting the lawful scope of such regulation. See, e.g., Mayor
& City Coun. of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. 268 Md. 79, 88, 299 A.2d 828, 833 (1973) (not standards of
"idiosyncratic group"); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449
(1964) (not "some sensitive or exquisite preference"); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y. 2d 462, 468, 191 N.E.2d 272,
276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (protecting "visual sensibilities of the

average person").
"'See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 73, 458 N.E.2d 852, 856 (1984).
"'See supra text accompanying note 74.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
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Such a standard of beauty will necessarily be inherently subjective and arbitrary regardless of whether its undefined content is provided by the court in
the exercise of its own independent judgment"' or on the basis of the court's
view of what most people in the community would consider to be "patently ugly."'" Moreover, as a public purpose for regulation, a "beauty for beauty's sake
alone" rationale unlinked to some other more substantial social interest for regulation seems hardly adequate as a governmental interest on which to justify
aesthetic regulation's negative impact on the values of pluralism and expression." 3
In addition to the substantive due process problem presented by the inherent subjectivity of a visual-beauty rationale for aesthetic regulation, a
visual-beauty premise creates the impossible task of satisfying the vagueness
due process requirement of setting forth intelligible standards for the implementation and administration of aesthetic regulation by design review
boards and other public agencies.'" If visual beauty, even in the limited context of defining what is "patently ugly," is the public purpose to be furthered
by regulation it would appear to be an intolerantly vague standard on which to
base particular regulatory decisions - a problem presented but not in this
author's opinion, satisfactorily addressed in several Ohio court opinions."5 A
visual-beauty rationale provides little, if any, guidance to public officials,
citizens or courts concerning the lawful application of aesthetic restrictions.
This would seem particularly true in regard to regulation of the details of
design such as the substitution of solid stone aggregate panels for plate glass
windows in a retail store, as occurred in Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc. '"
Even in a relational context, standards such as promoting "harmonious"
development in accordance with "accepted and recognized architectural principles" are essentially meaningless if interpreted and applied on the basis of a
visual-beauty premise for regulation." 7 More specific and objective design
"'See State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).
"2See P & S Inv. Co. v. Brown, 40 Ohio App. 2d 535, 320 N.E.2d 675 (1974).
"'This view no doubt accounts for the effort in middle-period court decisions to link aesthetic regulation to
traditional public purposes such as safety or protection of property values. See supra notes 53-66, 113-122
and accompanying text. The issue is not directly addressed in court decisions upholding regulation "solely
for aesthetics" but a number of commentators have rejected such a narrow basis for regulation. See, e.g..
Costonis, supra note 8, at 413-416; Michelman, supra note 115, at 38-42; Williams, supra note 20.
For recent court decisions upholding regulation "solely for aesthetics" but implicitly based on cultural
stability-identity values see infra notes 172-78.
'"See, e.g.. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (a law is unconstitutionally vague if "it leaves
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.").
"'See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 2d 535, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Village of
Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).
"'9Ohio St. 3d. 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).
'See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984) (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 101-03; Morristown Road Assoc. v. Mayor of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. Super. 58, 394 A.2d 157 (1978); City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863,
30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/1
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restrictions, such as a requirement that the "roof pitch" of a proposed structure
be "less than three vertical units in twelve" from a structure that it
resembles,' 8 may satisfy the vagueness due process problem but simply create
problems in demonstrating that, as applied, such restrictions further the public
purpose of preventing a "patently ugly" harm to the visual beauty of the surrounding area." '9
To the extent that a visual-beauty rationale underlies the Ohio Supreme
Court's "patently offensive" test established in Buckley,'5 the resulting
"patently ugly" standard for validity would significantly restrict and undermine landmark and historic district regulation.' As discussed earlier, the
"patently offensive" Buckley standard would prohibit regulation of a particular
structure solely to promote or preserve "beauty" in the visual form of the structure when viewed in isolation from its surrounding area.' A validating standard based on prevention of a "patently ugly" harm to the aesthetic character
of the surrounding area is one that clearly could not support most, if not all,
landmark or historic district designations. In fact, proponents of these forms of
aesthetic regulation seldom seek to justify them on the basis of some idealized
vision of beauty but rather on the basis of the historical and cultural associations that are thought to exist between a designated structure or set of structures and citizens in the community.'53
A visual-beauty rationale for aesthetic regulation, even when restricted by
the Buckley "patently offensive" test for validity, seems likely to perpetuate the
due process constitutional problems associated with aesthetic regulation in early
court decisions.' Despite efforts of aesthetic philosophers and others throughout the centuries to show the contrary, a regulation based on some official notion of visual beauty must necessarily involve an inherently subjective and arbitrary restriction on private rights.'55 Moreover, an official ban on, or preference for, visual forms of private expression based solely on their offensiveness or appeal is censorship in its baldest form and may often impact expression and self-fulfillment interests within the scope of First Amendment protection.' - A visual-beauty rationale for regulation seems unlikely to satisfy the
"'See Village of Hudson. 9 Ohio St. 3d at 71, 458 N.E.2d at 855.
"'See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.

"See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
"'For a comprehensive discussion of landmark and historic district ordinances see C.

DUERKSEN.

A HAND-

BOOK ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW (1983).

"'See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
"'Landmark and historic district ordinances generally are enacted and upheld by courts, not under a visualbeauty rationale, but based on other values such as tourism, preservation of property values or more recently, preserving the cultural, historical and educational values derived from the visual form of a structure or
set of structures. See WILLIAMS. supra note 7, §§ 71A.01-. 11.
"See supra text accompanying notes 28-45.
"'The most comprehensive and thoughtful criticism of visual beauty as a basis for police power regulation is
found in Costonis, supra note 8, at 395-410.
"See supra
19; Costonis, supra1986
note 8; Kolis,
Published
by note
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
Amendment 16 URD. L. ANN. 273 (1979); Williams,

Architectural Expression: Police Power and the First
supra note 20.

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 1
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1I

United States Supreme Court's requirement that aesthetic measures regulating
expressive activity based on the offensivensss of its content be both "narrowly
drawn" and advance a "sufficiently substantial governmental interest.""'
As the foregoing discussion attempts to demonstrate, a visual-beauty rationale for aesthetic regulation creates substantial, if not insurmountable,
problems in the interpretation of aesthetic doctrine as formulated in Buckley. 158
Retention of a visual-beauty rationale for regulation in interpretation and application of the "patently offensive" Buckley test for validity would seem both
unfortunate and unnecessary. As an explanation of the impetus and basis for
aesthetic regulation, the visual-beauty rationale is, as John Costonis makes
clear, fundamentally flawed by the conceptual defects that exist in its sensory,
formalistic, and semantic premises.' 9 There is little evidence to support the
visual-beauty rationale of preventing "eyesores" or "offensive visual forms"
based on the physiological or sensory predisposition of human beings to experience visual qualities in a relatively uniform manner.' 6° Aesthetic response
to visual form is largely based on the meanings ascribed to it by virtue of
thoughts and feelings shaped by the cultural context of our individual histories
and our experiences as members of political, economic, religious, and other
societal groups.' 6' Similarly, notions of visual beauty or ugliness cannot be
authoritatively and objectively defined by ontologically based canons of
aesthetic formalism but derive their meaning through human responses shaped
by time, culture, habitation and personal history.' Moreover, the visualbeauty rationale fails to appreciate the profound influence of the visual environment's semiotic properties on the way that people experience and describe
that environment. 63 Associational harmony, not an idealized vision of beauty,
is the primary impetus and basis for aesthetic regulation.
(b) Associational Harmony
Associational harmony, as the underlying rationale for aesthetic regulation, recognizes that the reciprocal social values of cultural stability and individual, group and community identity are shaped to a significant degree by
the semiotic properties of the visual environment.'" That the semiotic properties of the visual environment play a socially integrative and hence, identity"'See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981); Costonis, supra note 8, at 451-58.
"See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
"'See Costonis, supra note 8, at 395-4 10.

'Old. at 397-400.
1"Id.
" Id. at 401-07.
'"Id.at 408-09.
'"Id.at 418-24. The associationist theory of beauty which holds that objects are defined as beautiful on the
basis of associations that viewers have with them that are not necessarily related to the object's formal
aesthetic qualities, has received the attention of psychologists, sociologists, and social commentators for at
least two centuries. Id. at 424 n. 241.
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nurturing role in community life is a fact that has been intuited and exemplified in the work of painters, poets, writers and other artists throughout
recorded time.'65 The relationship is clearly reflected in Lewis Mumford's
description of the city as "both a physical utility for collective living and a symbol of those collective purposes and unanimities that rise under such favored
circumstances."'I The associational bonds derived from the semiotic properties of the visual environment represent a form of basic human attachment
behavior that, as John Bowlby points out, extends from "the cradle to the
grave." 67 The semiotic properties of the visual environment clearly reflect and
nurture our "social character" and reaffirm the sense of identity and bonding
6
necessary for positive cooperation in political, economic and social arenas. 1
As the social interest furthered by aesthetic regulation, associational harmony seeks to protect the human meanings and associations derived from the
form or character of the visual environment that are important sources of
orientation in the emotional and cognitive lives of individuals and communities. Regulation thus attempts to preserve and protect the rich network of
human meanings and associations derived from the form or character of the
visual environment by preventing the alteration or destruction of those
features of the visual environment widely perceived to give rise to such meanings and associations. Rather than involving "a mere matter of luxury or indulgence" as posited in traditional legal doctrine, aesthetic regulation protecting semiotic properties of the visual environment from destruction or alteration can be viewed as an attempt to preserve a fundamental type of human
relational bonding necessary for a sense of general well-being and social living.
As John Costonis points out, controversies about "beauty" in aesthetic
regulation are often, in effect, surrogates for controversies over the impact of
change in the visual environment which is perceived as out of harmony or incongruent with, and therefore a threat to diminish or destroy, those features of
the visual environment that are felt to play a socially integrative, and, hence,
identity-nurturing and culturally stabilizing role in the community.'69 In this
sense, the terms beauty and ugliness are superfluous as analytic concepts in
aesthetic regulation, but are merely conclusory terms that express the emotional character of a community's decision to prevent "associational
dissonance" in regard to those features of the visual environment which are
thought to support and nurture widely shared, though intangible, human
values that caused those features to be selected for preservation. "' In this view,
"'Id.at

418.

1"L. MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 5 (1938).

111J.
BOWLBY, THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF AFFECTIONAL BONDS 129 (1979).
'"See Costonis, supra note 8, at 392-409. See generally D. PREZIOSI, THE SEMIOTICS

OF THE BUILT ENVIRON.

MENT (1979).

"'See Costonis, supra note 8, at 419.
"'Id.at 418-20.
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aesthetic regulation functions, in essence, as a socially homeostatic device
preventing harm to those features of the visual commons widely perceived to
be impregnated with meanings and associations that fulfill individual and
group needs for identity confirmation.' 7 ' Regulation promoting associational
harmony thus attempts to preserve the sense of general well-being rooted in
the cultural stability-identity bonds existing between the visual environment
and the community.
Associational harmony, as a legitimizing basis for aesthetic regulation, is
proposed in recent commentary,' and is at least implicitedly recognized, as the
supporting basis for regulation in several court decisions. Rather than visual
beauty for beauty's sake alone, some court decisions have pointed towards
recognition of derivative human values related to "associational harmony" as
the legitimizing basis for aesthetic regulation. Some court opinions, as in Ohio,
do so in general terms by relating regulation of the visual environment to
"citizens' happiness, comfort and general well-being."' 73 Other court opinions
are more specific in regard to derivative human values that in the cultural context of regulation are found to be protected and furthered by a visually pleasing environment. As a Michigan court has pointed out, "a community's
aesthetic well-being can contribute to urban man's psychological and emotional stability" and "stimulate an identity and pride which is the foundation
for social responsibility and citizenship."'7 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
has stated that "the development and preservation of natural resources and
clean, salubrious neighborhoods contribute to psychological and emotional
stability and well-being as well as stimulate a sense of civic pride."' 75 Other
courts have similarly stressed the link between aesthetics and derivative
human values in the cultural context of regulation. 7 '
The "reasonableness" test for validity, often set out in court decisions as
limiting the permissible scope of aesthetic regulation under modern doctrine, '
may well come to be interpreted as requiring a linkage with widely shared
human values related to a visually pleasing environment. As New York and
New Jersey courts have suggested, aesthetic considerations supporting regulation should bear substantially, if not on economic values, on existing social and
cultural patterns of a community or district.'78 Though upholding the general
1711d '

111d at 418-34.
"'Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 71, 458 N.E.2d 852, 853 (1984).
4
11Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 53, 199 N.W.2d 525, 529 (1972).
"'State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 409, 416 A.2d 821, 824 (1980).
"6See, e.g., Commissioner v. Benenson, 329 A.2d 437, 441-42 (D.C. 1974); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or.
35, 46-47, 400 P.2d 255, 261-62 (1965).
"'See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
"'See Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 272, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 29-30 (1967);
Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 541, 324 A.2d 113, 120-21 (1974).
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validity of aesthetic regulation under modern doctrine, courts may require that
an aesthetic restriction not be based on some "museum standard" of beauty
held by an artistic elite but rather relate to a visual harm involving a
widespread pattern of community preference. As several court decisions have
suggested, aesthetic regulation
should be based on the "visual sensibilities of
"
the average person 1"9 and not embrace "some sensitive or exquisite

preference"' or the standards of "an idiosyncratic group."'' Aside from
relating the benefits of regulation to property values' or economics,' measuring the reasonableness of aesthetic regulation by a widespread pattern of community preference is likely to be of increasing importance as courts tend to emphasize derivative human values as a basis for such regulation rather than
simply beauty for beauty's sake alone.
Also, in ruling on the validity of aesthetic regulation, court decisions in
some cases implicitly distinguish between the goal of creating visual beauty as
opposed to preventing harm to existing visual features of the environment. As
the Maryland court pointed out, in a case where billboard restrictions were
held invalid, the purpose for regulation did not relate to "the preservation or
protection of something which was aesthetically pleasing, but rather was intended to achieve by regulation an aesthetically pleasing result."' " Pointing
out that a restricted use or structure may itself have artistic merit when viewed
in isolation or in a different visual setting, a number of court decisions have
found the legitimizing rationale of aesthetic regulation to be not the creation of
visual beauty in regard to a particular use or structure, but the prohibition of a
use or structure because it is deemed to be out of harmony or incongruent with
the existing character or visual features of the area within its perceptual
"' In this view, modern aesthetic doctrine can be interpreted as legitimizfield. 85
ing aesthetic regulation not on the basis of some absolutistic standard of beauty, but on the ground, as in all cases of environmental pollution, that a
restricted use or structure is simply "a resource out of place."'' This view of
the legitimacy of aesthetic regulation is suggested in Freund's work:
[Ilt is undesirable to force by law upon the community standards of taste
which a representative legislative body may happen to approve ....

But it

'People v. Stover, 122 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963).
'"United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964).
"'Mayor & City Coun. of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 88, 299 A.2d 828, 833 (1973).

"'See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984) and text accompanying notes 94-98 (linking aesthetics with protection of property values).
"'See, e.g., Mississippi State Highway Comm'n. v. Roberts Enterprises, Inc., 304 So. 2d 637 (Miss. 1974)
(linking aesthetics with economic interest in tourism).
'"Mayor & City Coun. of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973).
"'See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d
(1976); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971);
N.Y.S.2d 156, 159-60 (1975), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d
Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 544, 324 A.2d 113,
"See W.by
ROGERs,
ENVIRONMENTAL 1986
LAW
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,

2 (1977).

1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905
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is a different question whether the state may not protect the works of
nature or the achievements of art or the associations of history from being
willfully marred. In other words, emphasis should be laid upon the
character of the place as having an established claim to consideration and
as distinguished from the falling short of
upon the idea of disfigurement
187
some standard of beauty.
As the legitimizing basis for aesthetic regulation, associational harmony
has been implicitly recognized, at least in part, by Ohio courts. The Ohio
Supreme Court's emphasis in Buckley regarding the visual impact of a land use
or structure on the aesthetic character of the area within its perceptual field
clearly involves a focus on the associational harmony of visual forms.'
Similarly, Buckley and other Ohio decisions have legitimized regulation to prevent a "patently offensive" harm to the distinctive visual features of an area
that are generally felt to generate a positive aesthetic response, and thus
enhance the happiness, comfort, and general well-being of citizens." 9 Ohio
courts thus have expressly recognized, at least in general terms, that derivative
human values related to the visual environment constitute a legitimizing basis
for aesthetic regulation. Implicit recognition of associational harmony as a
basis for police power regulation also may explain the distinction sometimes
made in Ohio court decisions between regulating the visual form of a particular land use or structure and protecting the "character" of an area, assuming, as seems likely, that Ohio courts by referring to the "character" of an area
in this context were sanctioning regulation protecting widely shared human
associations derived from existing features of an area's visual environment.'"
Express recognition by Ohio courts of "associational harmony" as the
legitimizing basis for regulation would, when incorporated within the "patently offensive" test of Buckley, tend to ameliorate the due process constitutional
problems expressed in decisions concerning the arbitrariness and subjectivity
of aesthetic regulation. Rather than simply securing the benefit of creating or
promoting some idealized vision of beauty, associational harmony, as the
legitimizing purpose for regulation, would focus attention on prevention of
"patently offensive" harm to those existing features of the visual environment
whose semiotic properties are widely felt to play a socially integrative and
hence identity-nurturing and culturally-stabilizing role in community life. 9' As
a legitimizing standard for enactment, administration, and court review of
aesthetic regulation, it has the potential for substantially reducing the confusion and uncertainty resulting from the futile search for controlling standards
1

' E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 115-16 (2d ed. 1965).
'ss5eesupra text accompanying notes 70-77.

"9 See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984) (aesthetic character
of community "relates closely to its citizens' happiness, comfort, and general well-being").
"9"See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
"'See Costonis, supra note 8, at 418-34.
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of visual beauty. 9 '
While aesthetic response under the associational harmony rationale is, of
course, highly subjective even within a given culture, its "objectivity" would be
rooted in both the potential for articulating and describing those specific existing features of the visual environment intended to be protected from associational dissonance, and in the ability of reasonably competent planning staffs to
draft intelligible standards for implementation and administration based on relatively neutral and objective criteria, such as height, bulk, scale, topography,
and building materials, etc., derived from those visual features. 93 Its objectivity would also be grounded in the requirement that the desire for protection of
certain features of the visual environment reflect a widespread pattern of community preference rather than simply the desires of a narrow elite.'94 The
"patently offensive" test of Buckley would further assure that regulation
would not involve unrelated or insignificant details of design and visual form
by prescribing regulation aimed at promoting the "exquisite preferences" of a
community as measured not by some idealized standard of beauty but by the
existing features of the visual environment selected for protection. 9"
In addition to reducing the degree of subjectivity involved in regulation,
associational harmony, as the legitimizing rationale for aesthetic regulation, is
likely to broaden the lawful scope of such regulation. Where regulation impacts interests in expression that are within the scope of first amendment protection a regulation based on associational harmony is more likely to be
capable of being "narrowly drawn" and found to constitute a "sufficiently
substantial governmental interest" than a regulation supported by visualbeauty reasoning alone. I9 Associational harmony, as the social interest furthered by regulation, also would seem to provide a basis for legitimizing landmark and historic district designations under the "patently offensive" test of
Buckley. 97 While landmark and historic district designations are not intended
to prevent visual harm to nearby areas, they do provide the relational context
for analysis insisted upon in Buckley ' concerning whether the impact of proposed changes in visual form are associationally harmonious with those existing visual features of a protected structure or set of structures that have been
selected for preservation.199
"Id. at 432-39.
19'See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at § 71A.06; Costonis, supra note 8, at 426.

"'See P & S Inv. Co. v. Brown, 40 Ohio App. 2d 535, 320 N.E.2d 675 (1974) (applying "patently offensive"
test of Buckley based on "what the reaction of most people in urban communities would be").
"'See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. See also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773,
128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (aesthetic regulation limited to preventing developments "obviously incongruous"
with existing visual features of environment).
"See Costonis, supra note 8, at 446-58.
"'See generally supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
'"See supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
'"See WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at § 71.14. See generally DUERKSEN. supra note 151.
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Towards A Reformulation

The interpretive problems discussed above suggest the need for a reformulation of aesthetic doctrine governing regulation of land use and development in Ohio. Returning to the first of the two earlier stated legal propositions
at the beginning of this section, the foregoing analysis suggests the following
restatement of middle-period aesthetic doctrine: A regulation is valid as applied
if it has a real and substantial relationship to a legitimate public purpose (other
than aesthetic interests in protecting the visual form or character of a structure
or area) provided, however, that where the public purpose is derivative of the
aesthetic effect of regulation there is evidence in the record which
demonstrates a reasonable connection between the aesthetic effect of regulation and that public purpose. This restatement of middle-period doctrine would
make clear that regulation of a land use or structure to protect the visual form
or character of a nearby area is clearly an aesthetic purpose for regulation.' It
also would require that a reasonable connection be shown to exist between the
aesthetic effect of regulation and the derivative public purpose alleged to be
furthered in order to avoid the problem of legitimizing a "purely aesthetic"
regulation based on "assumed linkages" that may or may not exist.2 0' By requiring that the record demonstrate only a "reasonable connection" for such a
linkage to be found, the restatement of middle-period doctrine retains the usual
judicial deference to legislative and administrative judgments ordinarily accorded such findings by Ohio courts under the "presumption of validity" principle in other areas of police power regulation?02
Returning to the second of the two earlier stated legal propositions at the
beginning of this section, the foregoing analysis suggests the following restatement of modern aesthetic doctrine: A purely aesthetic regulation is valid as applied if it bears a real and substantial relationship to preventing a "patently offensive" harm to features of the visual environment selected for protection on
the basis of widely shared human associations and meanings attributed to
those visual features. This restatement of modern aesthetic doctrine in Ohio retains the "patently offensive" test of Buckley 3 but substitutes for visual beauty reasoning "associational harmony" as the impetus and legitimizing basis for
aesthetic regulation2°' - a rationale and context for analysis already implicitly
reflected in several Ohio court decisions.' As restated, modern doctrine would
uphold regulation "solely for aesthetics" only where:
wSee supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
supra text accompanying notes 114-22.

201See

" 2See, e.g.. Brown v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St. 2d 93, 420 N.E.2d 103 (1981) (discussing the presumption of
validity rule in Ohio).

-*'See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
'See supra text accompanying notes 164-87.
See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.

tm
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(1) There is a reasonable basis to believe that those features of the visual
environment selected for protection reflect and embody widely shared
human meanings and associations that the regulation is intended to
preserve;
(2) There exist reasonably intelligible standards for regulation derived
from those existing features of the visual environment selected for
protection; and
(3) That the regulation as applied is reasonably related to preventing a
"patently offensive" harm to those features of the visual environment
selected for protection.
The restatement of modern doctrine would accord to aesthetic regulation
the "fairly debatable" judicial deference given police power regulation in other
fields under the ordinarily applied "presumption of validity" maxim by
recognizing that a legislative decision to preserve and protect certain features
of the visual environment is one that should be deemed to presumptively advance community-wide associational values so long as that question is one
upon which reasonable persons may differ. As a validating standard for regulation, the doctrine as restated avoids the standards morass created by visual
beauty reasoning and yet has the potential for imposing a greater degree of
discipline on aesthetic regulation by requiring intelligible standards derived
from those features of the visual environment selected for protection, and by
requiring that regulation as applied prevent a "patently offensive" harm to
those features of the visual environment sought to be preserved. The doctrine
as restated would shift the attention of legislators, administrators, and reviewing courts away from the futile search for defensible standards of beauty or
ugliness. Instead, the doctrine would focus on the cogency of a claim that certain features of the visual environment relate to widely shared stability-identity
values, the identification and articulation of those specific features of the
visual environment sought to be protected, the clarity of regulatory standards
derived therefrom, and the extent to which regulation unnecessarily restricts
private rights in preventing substantial harm to those visual features. The doctrine acknowledges that aesthetic regulation is based on subjective patterns of
community preference as shaped by time and culture, but recognizes, as Ohio
court decisions have, that a community's protection of its visual commons to
prevent substantial harm to widely held human values derived therefrom constitutes a legitimate public purpose for police power regulation.2 Given the
subjective nature of aesthetic response, the doctrine as restated would seem an
appropriate and adequate constitutional standard for validity, leaving questions concerning the necessity for or wisdom of aesthetic regulation to
legislative determination.

.See, e.g., Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc. 9 Ohio St. 3d 69, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984).
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